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TITLE IX IN THE CLASSROOM:
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE POWER TO HARASS
JON GOULD*
Imagine the following situation in a company mail room.  A female em-
ployee is repeatedly questioned by her male supervisor about her sexual experi-
ences.  He wants to know how many partners she has had, what positions she
likes, and “what a man has to do to score with her.”  The questions are put to her
and her fellow female employees in a steady barrage during working hours be-
cause, the male employee says, he “wants to create a study of female sexual
habits.”
Now switch the setting.  Imagine instead that the questioning takes place in
a college classroom, in a psychology class perhaps.  As class begins in the
morning the male professor queries all of the female students in the front row
about their sexual practices.  He asks the same questions as the supervisor in the
mail room, and when challenged gives a similar explanation: he is thinking of
starting a new research project on female sexual habits.  But imagine that he, as
well as the mail room supervisor, have been subjecting their female students and
subordinates to this barrage for years.  In fact, both have a reputation as being a
bit of a  “lech.”
While the facts here do not mirror any particular case exactly, they do re-
flect a composite of sexual harassment cases in the employment and academic
environments.1  There are many instances in which women sue their employers
for hostile, intimidating and sexualized treatment in the workplace,2 and as re-
search has shown, sexual harassment is hardly less prevalent in the academy.3
However, when sexual harassment cases are brought from each setting the
plaintiffs hardly have an equal playing field.  Courts treat sexual harassment dif-
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1. See, e.g., Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that a professor was
removed from class for inappropriate remarks); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining, 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (finding that an administrative assistant claimed harassment based on fellow em-
ployee’s use of offensive language); Morgan v. Hertz, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 990 (W.D.
Tenn. 1981) (finding that male workers promoted over women because of employer’s bias).
2. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993) (finding female manager sub-
jected to sexual innuendoes and derogatory remarks); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983)
(finding female air traffic controller subjected to pervasive atmosphere of  “sexual slur, insult and
innuendo” and personal verbal sexual harassment); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.
Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (finding female welder subjected to pornographic posters and calendars
in workplace).
3. See STEPHEN MOREWITZ, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
245-47 (1996).
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ferently in the academy than in the workplace, at least to the extent the cases
concern the creation of a hostile environment.4  Unlike employment cases, courts
often seem to balance faculty and student conduct with concerns for “academic
freedom,” in the process dismissing collegiate claims that would go forward in
the workplace.5  While this paper agrees that academic freedom is an important
value and deserves to be considered in some collegiate cases, it contends that
academic freedom has the potential to become a defense that prohibits the
prosecution of cases that deny women equal treatment in the university setting.
In making this argument, the paper is divided into four sections.  The first
part describes sexual harassment law as it pertains to the workplace and the
academic environment.  In the second section the paper compares the applica-
tion of sexual harassment law in both settings.  While finding that quid pro quo
cases are not handled that differently between the shop floor and the academy,
the paper concludes that hostile environment cases—because they raise issues of
expression—are handled differently by the courts.  Plaintiffs in hostile environ-
ment workplace cases are generally more successful than their counterparts in
the college or university settings.  The third section considers the basis for that
distinction, focusing on the different importance placed on expression in the
workplace and the academy.  Because intra-academic expression is held in such
high esteem, many courts seem to counterbalance a separate right of academic
freedom in collegiate sexual harassment cases.6  Finally, using a few recent cases
in which the courts have thrown out hostile environment cases in the classroom,
the paper argues that academic freedom has been interpreted too broadly, be-
coming essentially a defense for courts—and perhaps collegiate administra-
tors—who do not want the difficult but essential task of distinguishing constitu-
tionally protected speech from illegal harassment.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
A. Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
While now well established in the law, sexual harassment has a more con-
voluted past.  In fact, rather than enjoying direct statutory support, the tort of
sexual harassment developed out of the larger doctrine of unfair employment
practices. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Laws, employers are prohibited
from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his . . . conditions
or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.”7  Originally, this language was used to bring suits chal-
lenging wages and promotions, but over time courts began to recognize that
4. See infra Part II.B.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986), sexual harassment law involves two claims: quid pro quo requests of sexual
acts for favorable treatment and the creation of a hostile work environment.
5. See, e.g., Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding college
sexual harassment policies may not be unconstitutionally vague); Silva v. University of N.H., 888 F.
Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994) (finding professor’s use of “jello” and “vibrator” had to be analyzed for
First Amendment protection).
6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
7. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2 (1994).
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harassment could become “so severe and pervasive that it affects the conditions
of employment” and thus violates Title VII’s prohibition of workplace discrimi-
nation.8
The initial wave of lawsuits under Title VII challenged racial harassment,9
but today Title VII supports claims for unfair harassment on the basis of race,
sex, religion, or national origin.10  This is not to say that the caseload is varied, for
the vast majority of harassment claims are those alleging sexual misconduct.  In
fact, “harassment” today has widely come to mean sexual harassment.  The
various legal manuals on the subject speak primarily of sexual harassment.11  The
courts have become accustomed to seeing mainly sexual, not racial harassment
cases.12  Even the EEOC, while noting that harassment cases may cover race and
other bases, has drafted regulations dedicated solely to sexual harassment.13
As commentators have noted, sexual harassment law is directed against the
“kinds of prejudice and stereotyped thinking” that treat women as “one-
dimensional sex objects.”14  Particularly as women have become more equal
partners in the workplace and classroom, the consequences of sexual harassment
are both personally and professionally debilitating.  As a recent study indicates,
a majority of women experience physical harassment on the job, with nearly
two-thirds of women reporting that they have faced verbal harassment at work.15
These are not simply small slights that can  be sloughed off.  Studies show that a
vast majority of sexual harassment victims “experience [an] adverse effect on
their work performance.”16  Victims “frequently are angry, embarrassed, fearful,
and anxious about the incidents. . . . [T]hey feel less trustful, have problems in
their . . . work, and develop negative attitudes toward career development.”17  In
the most severe cases of sexual harassment, victims may suffer headaches,
sleeplessness, fatigue, gastrointestinal problems, and appetite loss.18  Some
“experience significant disruption in their relationships with their boyfriends or
husbands,” and almost all see their attendance and work or academic perform-
8. BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 10
(1992).
9. The numbers were so great that one commentator has called Title VII’s first years “a sub-
stantive law on blacks.” CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 127
(1979).
10. In a footnote to 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998), the EEOC declares that the “principles of
[harassment law] continue to apply to race, color, religion or national origin” in addition to sex.
11. See, e.g., LAWYERS COOPERATIVE PUBLISHING, HANDLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1993).
12. See LINDEMANN & KADUE,  supra note 8, at 8; Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV.
813, 815 (1991).
13. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998).
14. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 8, at 8; see also MOREWITZ,  supra note 3 (arguing that poli-
ticization of gender roles underlies recent sexual harassment law).
15. See Deborah Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running
the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 403 (1996).  In a 1994 survey of
2000 lawyers at twelve large law firms across the nation, 91% of the women and only 13% of the
men reported that they had been subject to verbal harassment within the past year.  See id.
16. Id. at 404.
17. MOREWITZ,  supra note 3, at 253.
18. See id.
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ance suffer.19
It is important to remember that the claim of sexual harassment is exclu-
sively a creation of the common law.  At no time has Congress passed legislation
expressly prohibiting sexual harassment.  While the EEOC has issued regula-
tions both defining and prohibiting sexual harassment, the courts have essen-
tially created this doctrine by reading in a claim of sexual harassment to the
larger area of sex discrimination.20  At any point the courts might have retreated,
and in fact, there were ample legal bases to refuse to create the tort. Judges
might have declined to create new law when there was not direct statutory sup-
port.21  They might have concluded that the terms of the claim, including such
requisites as “unwelcome,” “hostile,” or “intimidating,” were too ambiguous or
vague to survive judicial scrutiny.22  They might have refused to extend the claim
to verbal harassment.  Or they might have dismissed the underlying theory of
sexual harassment on the grounds that it would chill relations in the workplace
by making co-workers “walk on egg shells.”
To be sure, several courts have adopted these positions and refused to rec-
ognize sexual harassment claims.23  But as the U.S. Supreme Court announced in
1986, sexual harassment is not only founded under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Laws but the claim has two bases: quid pro quo harassment; and the creation of
a hostile, intimidating or offensive workplace.24  Quid pro quo harassment gen-
erally covers sexual advances or requests for sexual favors when presented as a
condition of employment.25  It is hostile workplace harassment that is most rele-
vant to this paper.  The tort of hostile workplace harassment  has five elements:
1 verbal or physical conduct of a sexual or sex-based nature;
2 that is unwelcome;
19. Id.
20. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
21. According to the courts, sexual harassment flows from 42 U.S.C.  2000e-2 of the federal
code, which declares it unlawful for “an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”  Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).  At no point does this statute explicitly mention sexual harassment.
Rather, the courts have read sexual harassment to be sex discrimination “with respect to  [an indi-
vidual’s] terms . . . of employment.”  Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also
Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
22. As one court defines this objection, “[a] statute is unconstitutionally vague when men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.  A statute must give adequate warning
of the conduct which is to be prohibited and must set out explicit standards for those who apply it.”
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (citations omitted).
23. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding plaintiff
must prove employer knowledge); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), va-
cated and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding employer not liable where harassing behav-
ior not in furtherance of employer policy or interest); Clark v. World Airways, Inc., 24 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305 (D.D.C. 1980) (finding the president of company not supervisor).
24. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
25. See id. at 65.
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3 that is directed against an individual because of her (or his) sex;
4 That has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an indi
vidual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive 
working environment.
5 And that an employer knew or should have known of and did not take 
adequate action to stop or prevent.26
In defining what cases rise to the level of a hostile or intimidating environ-
ment, the courts have added the requirement that verbal or physical conduct be
“severe” or “pervasive.”27  The courts have also grappled with the proper stan-
dard for evaluating such conduct—whether acts should be viewed “objectively”
from the courts’ perspective or “subjectively” from that of the victim.28  The ac-
cepted rule, that cases should be evaluated by a reasonable person in the same
circumstances of the victim, is, as well as much of the tort,  a creation of the
courts.29
B. Sexual Harassment on Campus
To the extent that collegiate harassment cases involve collegiate employees,
Title VII applies.  Like any employer, colleges and universities are bound by the
civil rights laws and the EEOC’s regulations.30  Thus, cases between co-workers,
faculty and even student employees (in the course of their employment only)
can be brought under Title VII.
Besides Title VII, many colleges have adopted their own sexual harassment
policies, covering students, faculty and staff, whether in a work setting or not.
According to a 1994 study of the policies at public universities, 300 of 384
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998).
27. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1523.  The court reiterated Meritor in stating, “[t]o affect a ‘term,
condition or privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title VII, the harassment must be suf-
ficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abu-
sive working environment.’”  Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).  This
test “is a question to be determined with regard to the totality of the circumstances.”  Id. (quoting
Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987)).  As another court has said,
“[w]hile an isolated incident is not enough, the number of incidents alone is not determinative . . . .
Conversely, incidents that are much less severe may constitute harassment in the context of a
working atmosphere ‘polluted’ with racial tension.”  Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d
1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1991).
28. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (focusing on the perspective of victim to
determine whether sexual harassment is sufficiently severe to be actionable); Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that a district court possesses broad discretion in
considering evidence establishing actionable sexual harassment and must adopt a reasonable person
standard); Highlanders v. K.F.C. Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring that a court
must adopt perspective of reasonable person’s reaction to similar environment under similar or like
circumstances).
29. See Daniel’s v. Essay Group, Inc., 937 F. 2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir. 1991) (offering a judicial ex-
planation).
30. In this situation both the perpetrator and victim would have to be employees of the college
or under its control to trigger Title VII.
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schools had a sexual harassment policy.31  Almost all of the policies are modeled
on the EEOC’s regulations, and many take an expansive view of improper be-
havior.  For example, the University of Iowa’s policy encompasses verbal con-
duct, covering comments, statements, jokes, questions, anecdotes, and remarks.32
Even a policy statement from the American Council on Education suggests that
sexual harassment may include “inappropriate put-downs of individual per-
sons.”33
Besides these internal policies, students may also use Title IX of the Civil
Rights Laws34 to pursue a private action against their schools for sexual harass-
ment.  Title IX, of course, is best known as a gender equity statute, having been
“designed to protect individuals from sex discrimination by denying federal fi-
nancial aid to those educational institutions that bear responsibility for sexually
discriminatory practices.”35  Title IX provides that:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.36
At no point does Title IX speak of sexual harassment, nor does it reference
terms from Title VII or any other employment-related legislation or regulation.
Yet, the “courts have regularly applied Title VII principles” when “reviewing
sexual discrimination claims by teachers and other employees of educational in-
stitutions under Title IX.”37  “Courts have also relied upon Title VII . . . in recog-
nizing that Title IX prohibits the existence of a hostile environment due to a
teacher’s sexual harassment of a student.”38  Granted, many of these cases in-
volve primary or secondary schools where the greater need for discipline may
outweigh other interests in public discourse,39 but Title IX has also been used to
apply the  hostile work environment standard to sexual harassment at the uni-
versity level.40  Nor do these cases involve only university employment which
Title VII would cover.  Many of Title IX’s sexual harassment claims flow from
the heart of the educational program—classroom instruction.  They include such
cases as Rubin v. Ikenberry,41 where a professor regularly engaged in outrageous
“sexual commentary, inquiries and jokes during class,”42 and McClellan v. Board
31. See ARATI R. KORWAR, WAR OF WORDS: SPEECH CODES AT PUBLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVER-
SITIES 32 (1994).
32. See SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A LEGAL COMPENDIUM 179, (Elsa Kircher Cole ed.,
1990).  Other schools, like Mt. Holyoke College, prohibit verbal actions, including “unwelcome slurs
[or] jokes.”  Mt. Holyoke College Policy on Human Rights (last modified Sept. 4, 1998)
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/cic/stulife/handbook/hbkl04.shtml>.
33. Id. at 224.
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
35. Davis v. Monroe County  Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1996).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
37. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1190.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
40. See, e.g., Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (C.D. Pa. 1985), aff’’d, 800
F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
41. 933 F. Supp. 1425 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
42. Id. at 1429.
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of Regents of the State University,43 in which a faculty member harassed a student
about her body.  As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools,44 “a student should have the same protection in school that
an employee has in the workplace. . . . Indeed, where there are distinctions be-
tween the school environment and the workplace, they ‘serve only to emphasize
the need for zealous protection against sex discrimination in the schools.’”45
Title IX is in many ways like Title VII, by its terms prohibiting the general
wrong of gender discrimination. However, cases under Title IX lack the more
specific criteria that the EEOC has instituted for Title VII.  For example, unlike
the regulations that cover sexual harassment cases in the workplace, Title IX
contains no statutory requirement that conduct be hostile, intimidating or un-
welcome.  As a practical matter, though, Title IX cases turn on the same sorts of
behavior as do their Title VII counterparts: litigants must demonstrate conduct,
directed to them on account of their gender, that is so “sufficiently obvious and
severe or pervasive” that it denies them their equal rights to education.46  For ex-
ample, in Davis v. Monroe County,47 the Eleventh Circuit permitted a case to pro-
ceed in which a student had been “sexually harassed on a continuous basis” by a
classmate who attempted to “fondle her” and “direct[ed] offensive language to-
ward her.”48  Like sexual harassment cases in the workplace, the courts have
read in a private claim of sexual harassment to Title IX so that the remedies
available in a suit brought under Title IX are substantially similar to those aris-
ing under Title VII.49
II. COMPARISON OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
A. Workplace
It has now been over twenty years  since the courts first considered sexual
harassment claims.50  Over that time, the lower courts have legitimized the
claim,51 with the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Meritor confirming what other
courts had already established: that sexual harassment is a viable claim in the
workplace.52  Certainly, the courts have been willing to uphold claims for quid
pro quo harassment, whether between supervisors and employees or simply co-
43. 921 S.W.2d 684 (Tenn. 1996).
44. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
45. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Patri-
cia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292-93 (N.D.Cal. 1993)).
46. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 637 F. Supp. 789, 801 (D.P.R. 1986).
47. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996).
48. Id. at 1188-89; see also Lam v. Curators of the Univ. of MO., 122 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a single allegedly offensive videotape did not create a pervasive hostile environment
for a university dental school student).
49. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72.
50. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra  note 8, at 3.
51. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
52. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57-58 (1986).
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workers.  For example, in Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital,53 nurses were
subject to continuous sexual demands from a doctor who tried to pull them
“onto his lap, hugging and kissing them while wiggling.”54  The California
Court of Appeals remanded the case so that the plaintiff could amend her com-
plaint to establish a cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment.55
So too,  hostile work environment cases  pass judicial muster.  The easiest
cases are those covering physical harassment, including touching, groping, or
acts of sabotage.56  For example, in the case of Maturo v. National Graphics Inc.,57
the court found sexual harassment when a co-worker “came up from behind
plaintiff, grabbed her arms, . . . and  fondled her.”58  In addition, in Woods v.
Graphic Communications,59 the court based a finding of harassment on such ac-
tions as “a karate chop” and the scrawling of graffiti near the plaintiff’s work
space.60
The courts also seem willing to extend  hostile work environment to verbal
conduct or expression, including such things as “gender-baiting, teasing, [or]
hazing.”61  For example, the court in Katz v. Dole62 upheld a claim of sexual har-
assment when the plaintiff “was personally the object of verbal sexual harass-
ment by her fellow” workers.63 The “harassment took the form of extremely vul-
gar and offensive sexually related epithets,” using words “widely recognized as
not only improper but as intensely degrading, deriving their power to wound
not only from their meaning but also from ‘the disgust and violence they express
phonetically.’”64
The Katz court was among the more decorous, refusing to list the degrading
words at issue.  But there are cases in which “cunt” and “pussy” are some of the
more pleasant terms used,65 and others where women confront their tormenter in
front of their manager with, “You have called me a fucking bitch,” only to be an-
swered, “No, I didn’t, I called you a fucking cunt.”66  In fact, the Supreme Court
has refused to overturn a case of sexual harassment based largely on “unwanted
sexual innuendos.”  In that case,  Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,67 the company
53. 214 Cal. App. 3d 590 (1989).
54. Id. at 600; see also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (abolishing female em-
ployee’s job for refusing male supervisor’s sexual advances violated the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding the employer
liable for tortious conduct of employee who held a supervisory position over the plaintiff).
55. See Fisher, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 622.
56. By its very nature, physical harassment closely resembles quid pro quo acts.  Moreover, it
does not engender any First Amendment defense, which verbal harassment may generate.
57. 722 F. Supp. 916 (D. Conn. 1989).
58. Id. at 921.
59. 925 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1991).
60. Id. at 1198.
61. LINDEMANN & KADUE,  supra note 8, at 170.
62. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
63. Id. at 254.
64. Id.
65. See McNabb v. CubFoods, 352 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 1984) (describing language used by the
plaintiff co-worker).
66. Id. at 381.
67. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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president “often insulted [the employee] because of her gender,” calling her a
“dumb ass woman,” and  telling her on several occasions, in the presence of
other employees, “‘[y]ou’re a woman, what do you know’ and ‘[w]e need a man
as the rental manager.’”68
In response, some courts have gone so far as to require that employers
“take prompt action to prevent . . . bigots from expressing their opinions in a
way that abuses or offends their co-workers,” by “informing people that the ex-
pression of racist or sexist attitudes in public is unacceptable.”69  Others have
banned such inquiries as “Did you get any over the weekend?”70  “Many courts
have permitted [sexual] harassment actions to proceed based in part upon offen-
sive speech that was not directed toward the plaintiff. . . and some courts have
permitted [sexual] harassment actions based in part upon speech that was not
even witnessed by the plaintiff.”71  In fact, it took until 1991 for a defendant to
raise, and for a court to rule on, a First Amendment defense to  hostile work en-
vironment.  In that case, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 72 the court balanced
the “governmental interest in cleansing the workplace of impediments to the
equality of women” against the free speech interest in “sexually demeaning re-
marks and jokes,” as well as “pictures of nude and partially nude women in
sexually suggestive poses.”73  Not surprisingly given the terms of this test, the
court found the First Amendment defense lacking.74 Yet Jacksonville Shipyards is
far from an anomaly.  As Professor Eugene Volokh has amply chronicled, the
courts are quite willing to uphold claims of verbal harassment in the work-
place.75
It is hardly a stretch to say that the courts grant special deference to sexual
harassment claims in the workplace, a fact seen most plainly in the case of R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul.76  In R.A.V., the Court had the opportunity to consider a mu-
nicipal hate code,  St. Paul, Minnesota’s Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.77  Un-
der that ordinance, individuals were prohibited from displaying a symbol
“which one knows or has reasonable grounds  to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender . . . .”78
In a somewhat fragmented opinion, the Supreme Court overturned the law on
the basis of its content discrimination,79 concluding that the ordinance imposed
“special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on the disfavored
68. Id. at 19.
69. Davis v. Montsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3166
(1989).
70. Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123, 128 (W.D. Tenn. 1981).
71. Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 535 (1991).
72. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
73. Id. at 1493, 1522, 1536.
74. See id. at 1536.
75. See Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L.J. 563 (1995).
76. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
77. See id. at 380.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 378.
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subjects of ‘race, color, creed, religion or gender.’”80
Under this reasoning, one  might also have expected the Court to overturn
sexual harassment law.  It too “imposes special prohibitions on those speakers
who express views on the disfavored subject of . . . gender,”81 and as the lower
courts have shown, an individual may not hurl sexual invectives at his female
co-workers and escape a finding of sexual harassment.82  Yet the Supreme Court
refused to include sexual harassment claims in its broad prohibition against
content discrimination.  To the contrary, the Court went so far as to craft a delib-
erate exception for sexual harassment, saying such claims really reflect a situa-
tion where “a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of
speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at
conduct rather than speech.”83
This exception did not escape the attention of the concurring justices in
R.A.V.  In criticizing the majority’s reasoning, Justices White, Blackmun,
O’Connor and Stevens noted that “[u]nder the broad principle the Court uses to
decide the present case, hostile work environment claims based on sexual har-
assment should fail First Amendment review.”84  Because the Court could not
accept that result, the concurrence suggests, it crafted an exception to cover sex-
ual harassment claims.85  In essence, the Court felt compelled to protect the vi-
ability of sexual harassment claims in the workplace.
B. College/University
On the other hand, the courts are not so deferential to sexual harassment
claims arising in the collegiate setting.  As an initial matter, the Supreme Court
decided just this year that the standards of notice are different for Title VII and
IX claims.  In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,86 the High Court ruled that plaintiffs
may pursue a Title VII sexual harassment claim even if the employer did not
know—but should have known—of the alleged harassment.87  By contrast, in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,88 the Court held that actual notice
was required for a Title IX sexual harassment case.89
It is true that the courts treat some collegiate sexual harassment claims like
analogous cases in the employment setting.  Indeed, judges do seem to take aca-
demic quid pro quo cases seriously, regularly upholding the actions of adminis-
trators who discipline faculty and staff who use their positions of power to try to
80. Id. at 380.
81. Id.  That is, under the hostile work environment test, defendants can be held liable for
speech that disparages a woman on the basis of her gender.
82. Technically, it is the employer that would be found liable for maintaining a hostile work
environment.  But it is the behavior of supervisors or co-workers that creates the hostile work envi-
ronment.
83. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389.
84. Id. at 409-10 (White, J. et al., concurring).
85. Id. at 419 (White, J., concurring).
86. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
87. See id. at 2271.
88. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
89. See id. at 1993.
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extract sexual favors from students or subordinates.90  A classic example is Parks
v. Wilson:91
[D]efendant told [the plaintiff] that she would need to have sexual intercourse
with him in order to graduate.  She did not have sexual intercourse with defen-
dant, but she agreed to allow him to take photographs of her in the nude.  The
two arranged to meet at defendant’s rented home.  Plaintiff appeared at the
home on the appointed date with her father, now deceased, secreted away in
the back seat of the car.  When defendant met her at the car, the father emerged
from the car to defendant’s surprise.  At that point, according to plaintiff’s tes-
timony, defendant exclaimed: “I give up.  You graduate.  You graduate.”92
But when the claim is for a hostile educational environment, the courts are
hardly as sympathetic.  Part of the reason that the courts do not act as favorably
to academic harassment cases is that they are not as familiar with them.  While
they are regularly inundated by sexual harassment claims in the workplace,  an
on-line computer search shows that academic environment cases are filed less
than ten percent as often as workplace claims.93  The reasons for this disparity
are somewhat speculative, although it may be that academicians, because they
keep abreast of societal changes, are more likely to conform their behavior to
evolving sexual harassment standards.  Or, more plausibly, it may be that many
collegiate harassment cases are handled internally.  Indeed, for an academic har-
assment claim even to reach the courts one of two things must occur: either the
victim must file a Title IX suit against the school, claiming that the institution
failed to respond to the alleged harassment; or the perpetrator must file a claim
against the school’s disciplinary process, charging that the institution did not
follow its procedures or that the punishment somehow violated his rights to
conduct class or express himself.94
However, regardless of whether the courts are familiar with hostile envi-
ronment claims in the academy, they are more suspicious of these cases than
those in the workplace. This is not the same as saying that courts refuse to enforce
sexual harassment claims between faculty and students.  For as McClellan v.
Board of Regents95 and Rubin v. Ikenberry96 attest, there are cases in which the
90. See, e.g., McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that university properly fired
professor because of sexual harassment); Wexley v. Michigan State, 25 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir. 1994)
(affirming the district court’s ruling in favor of university that fired tenured professor for making
sexual advances towards students); Korf v. Ball State Univ., 726 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming
summary judgment for university in suit brought by professor fired for sexual advances towards
students).
91. 872 F. Supp. 1467 (D.S.C. 1995).
92. Id. at 1468-69.
93. Research results are from a September 1998 Lexis search of Title VII and Title IX cases in
state and federal courts.
94. That is, given Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998), the plaintiff
must first give the school a chance to remedy the harassment before charging it with maintaining a
sexually hostile academic environment.  Similarly, as the courts in Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley
College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996) and Silva v. University of New Hampshire, 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H.
1994) show, those charged under a school’s sexual harassment code may also challenge the policy in
court as abridging their First Amendment rights.
95. 921 S.W.2d 684 (Tenn. 1996).
96. 933 F. Supp. 1425 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
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courts have upheld hostile environment claims against professors.  In McClellan,
the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld a finding of sexual harassment against a
professor at Middle Tennessee State University who, in the course of a clinical
health class, looked under a female student’s t-shirt, remarking that she was “no
Dolly Parton.”97  “The next day [the professor] asked [the student] if she believed
in ‘equal rights.’ When she said she did, he inquired why women should not re-
move their shirts for EKG procedures as men did. He also commented that since
she had several brothers, being nude around males should not affect her.”98
In Rubin, a federal district court ruled that the University of Illinois acted
appropriately in disciplining a professor where the complainant alleged that the
professor “created a sexually demeaning and sexually threatening environment
in [his]class.”99  Among the comments the professor was alleged to have said in-
cluded:
You’re smart—for a woman.  Was that sexist?  I have to tease to keep you
awake. . . . The problem in schools is uppity, greedy women. . . . If I were king,
all women teachers would have to spend fifteen minutes on a moonlit night, in
a canoe, on a lake with a drunken sailor. . . . Suppose a husband and wife came
to your adult education class and requested you teach a class on lovemaking be-
cause the cause of divorce is incompatibility and lovemaking is part of compati-
bility—so would you teach a class on lovemaking?  Foreplay?  Afterplay?100
However,  there are many more cases where hostile environment claims
meet a skeptical judiciary.101  Perhaps the best example is Cohen v. San Bernardino
Valley College,102 where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce a
college’s sexual harassment policy against an English professor.103  In that case,
the College of San Bernardino had adopted a sexual harassment policy modeled
almost identically on Title VII standards.104  Shortly after its adoption, a female
student charged her professor with violating the new policy for his “statements
and conduct” in class.105  The professor taught a required remedial English
course, and according to the District Court, used a “controversial teaching
style,” which included a “repeated focus on topics of a sexual nature” and
97. McClellan, 921 S.W.2d at 686.
98. Id.
99. Rubin, 933 F. Supp. at 1445.
100. Id. at 1445-47.
101. See Booher v. Board of Regents, No. 2:96-CV-135, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11404, at *1 (C.D.
Ky. July 21, 1998) (stating that university sexual harassment policy unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad); Lam v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 122 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 1997) (single videotape that
contained sexual innuendo shown by university instructors did not create a pervasive hostile envi-
ronment); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding students’ sexual harassment
claims against the university were moot because they had graduated and that other students lacked
standing because their claims were too speculative).
102. 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996).
103. Id. at 973.
104. Id.  Under the policy, a faculty member could be disciplined for “unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature”
when “such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s aca-
demic performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive learning environment.” Id. at
970.
105. Id. at 970.
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regular “use of profanity and vulgarities.”106  In the spring semester of 1992, the
professor began class discussion on the issue of pornography and played the
“devil’s advocate” by asserting controversial viewpoints.107  During a classroom
discussion on the subject, the professor stated in class that he wrote for Hustler
and Playboy, and he read some articles out loud in class.108  At the end of class
discussion, he required his students to write essays defining pornography.109 Ac-
cording to the student, the professor then told her that if she met him in a bar, he
would help her get a better grade.110  Furthermore,  she claimed, that “he would
look down her shirt, as well as the shirts of other female students.”111  He even
told her that, “she was overreacting because she was a woman.”112
The professor’s conduct had already warranted punishment from college
officials, but the  Ninth Circuit ruled that the behavior:
Did not fall within the core region of sexual harassment as defined by the
[College’s Sexual Harassment] Policy.  Instead, officials of the College, on an
entirely ad hoc basis, applied the Policy’s nebulous outer reaches to punish
teaching methods that [the professor] had used for many years . . .  [The profes-
sor] was simply without any notice that the Policy would be applied in such a
way as to punish his longstanding teaching style. 113
Similarly, in the case of Silva v. University of New Hampshire,114 a federal dis-
trict court overturned disciplinary action against a communications instructor
who had been reprimanded by the University for sexual harassment.115  Among
the charges against him were that he sexualized classroom discussion and made
personally or sexually offensive statements to female students outside of class.116
As one student remembered the class, “Don Silva was trying to explain another
subject, and to do so he used the analogy of intercourse, ‘Find the target, loosen
up, back and forth, side to side.’”117  He also described a belly dancer as being
like a “bowl of jello being stimulated by a vibrator.”118
By contrast, Silva claimed his comments were more benign:
I will put focus in terms of sex, so you can better understand it.  Focus is like
sex.  You seek a target.  You zero in on your subject.  You move from side to
side.  You close in on the subject.  You bracket the subject and center on it.  Fo-
cus connects experience and language.  You and the subject become one.119
That the court would credit Silva’s testimony over the students’ memories
106. Id.
107. See Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1996).
114. 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
115. See Id. at 332.
116. See Id. at 302.
117. Id. at 301.
118. Id. at 300.
119. Id. at 299.
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is not that egregious, but the court seems to have ignored charges from “several
students [who] described things that were said to them [by Silva] as individuals
during various library exercises that were personally and/or sexually offensive.
They all expressed a fear of going to speak to him directly because they would
never wish to be alone with him.”120
In spite of the student’s testimony, the court concluded that Silva’s
“classroom statements advanced his valid educational objective of conveying
certain principles related to the subject matter of his course” and were protected
by the First Amendment.121  The comments “were made in a professionally ap-
propriate manner as part of a college class,” and were not so outrageous as to
offend the sensibilities of a reasonable person.122  The court went even further,
concluding that the University’s sexual harassment policy was not “reasonably
related to the legitimate pedagogical  purpose of providing a congenial academic
environment because it employs an impermissibly subject standard” in deter-
mining which behavior rises to the level of outrageousness.123  How the court
reached this conclusion is confusing, since the University of New Hampshire’s
sexual harassment policy tracked almost identically the terms of Title VII.124
Neither Cohen nor Silva is an anomaly at the college level, where other
courts also seem equally reluctant to punish faculty for their conduct and be-
havior to students.125  But what makes these cases so unusual is that if a similar
fact pattern were to occur in the workplace, a court would likely find a violation
of sexual harassment.  Indeed, Cohen is not that different from Morgan v. Hertz,126
where a supervisor questioned employees about their sexual practices,127 or
EEOC v. Horizons Hotel Corporation,128 where a co-worker unleashed a “stream of
comments about [the plaintiff’s] body” and propositioned her for sex.129  Sexually
suggestive speech can be actionable on the shop floor, yet courts seem reluctant
to enforce similar norms in the classroom.
III. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
How then do we explain the courts’ different treatment of hostile environ-
ment claims between the workplace and the academy?  Why are courts willing
120. Id. at 300.
121. Id. at 313.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 314.
124. According to the UNH sexual harassment policy, sexual harassment encompassed
“[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature . . . when such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual’s work performance or creating a hostile or offensive working or academic environ-
ment.” Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 298.  Granted, the policy did give examples of sexual harassment in-
cluding “sexually suggestive objects of pictures in the workplace” or “sexually degrading words to
describe a person.” Id.  However, all of these examples have previously supported harassment cases
in the workplace.  See LINDEMANN & KADUE,  supra note 8.
125. See infra note 101.
126. 542 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1981).
127. See Id. at 128.
128. 831 F. Supp. 10 (D.P.R. 1993).
129. Id. at 12.
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to enforce quid pro quo cases between faculty and students, but yet seem reluc-
tant to extend hostile work environment principles from Title VII to the aca-
demic environment?
Ironically, the answer comes to us from the Cohen and Silva courts.  In re-
viewing both decisions it is difficult to see how the courts could have reached
their rulings unless they concluded that special “protection [should] be given a
public college’s professor’s classroom speech.”130  Among other things, the
court’s conclusion in Cohen that a faculty member has to be warned of a policy’s
reach would be preposterous if applied in the workplace.131  In such case, a
group of men who had previously hassled their female co-workers could not be
held responsible under a sexual harassment rule unless they were first person-
ally warned by a supervisor that their behavior violated the policy.132  This is
simply not the case, as supervisors and employees alike are held responsible for
informing themselves of new personnel policies and conforming their behavior
to any new standards.133
The Silva court was even more direct, essentially enshrining Silva’s speech
under the “transcendent value” of “academic freedom.”134  Said the court, “our
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom.”135  That free-
dom “does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”136
In Silva’s case, his classroom statements “were made for the legitimate peda-
gogical, public purpose of conveying certain principles related to the subject
matter of his course,” and thus merited special protection from the court.137
That the courts would seek to enshrine academic speech is not surprising,
nor for that matter is it necessarily ill advised.  Universities occupy a hallowed
position in American culture.  We enshrine scholarly life, as politicians, journal-
ists and the general public prize the intellectual inquiry carried on there.  In-
deed, the courts have joined this chorus in their historical approach to campus
speech,138 concluding the classroom to be “peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
130. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1996).
131. See id. at 972.
132. See id.
133. See Weaver v. Minnesota Valley Labs Inc., 470 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. App. 1991).
134. Silva v. University of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293, 314 (D.N.H. 1994).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 314 (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1987)).
137. Id. at 316.  While the court does enshrine Silva’s comments under academic freedom, much
of the rest of its argument is confusing.  The court seems to apply the Conick-Pickering test to claim
that Silva is also protected as a public employee speaking on a matter of public concern.  See id.   The
court’s rationale is that because the “issue of whether speech which is offensive to a particular class
of individuals should be tolerated in American schools” counts as a matter of public concern, so do
Silva’s in-class comments.  Id.  However, “Silva was not punished for speech on a political or social
issue, but for using sexually hostile remarks to teach writing.  If the court’s flawed interpretation of
what constitutes a public concern were widely adopted, the harassing speech of university profes-
sors would be insulated in almost every case, regardless of the particular circumstances.” Amy H.
Candido, Comment, A Right to Talk Dirty?: Academic Freedom Values and Sexual Harassment in the
University Classroom, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE  85, 111 (1997).
138. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (finding a state university’s regulation of speech
to be content-neutral); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (finding the New York
statute barring employment in public universities of “subversive” persons unconstitutionally
vague); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (finding a lecturer’s right to academic free-
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ideas.’”139  As enunciated by one court, “[t]he Nation’s future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.’”140
In 1940, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the
Association of American Colleges (AAC) issued their Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure.  As part of that statement, the AAUP and AAC
said:
The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free expres-
sion.  Academic freedom is essential to these purposes. . . . Academic freedom in
its teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the rights of the teacher
in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning.141
The AAUP and AAC’s statement, being a fairly broad declaration, does not
define the limits of academic freedom, nor for that matter have the courts set out
specific rules for its application.  One commentator has argued that academic
freedom has two components—a protection for professors against administra-
tive or political interference with research, teaching and governance,” and a
“constitutional academic freedom” that insulates the university in its “core aca-
demic affairs from interference by the state.”142  In his view, the courts should
only have jurisdiction over the latter constitutional academic freedom, with the
former freedom the province of faculty interactions with administrators and out-
side regulators.143
But the courts have seemed to apply a blanket academic freedom to schol-
arly activities at the collegiate level.144  As the Supreme Court has said,
“[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die.”145  Part of what concerns the courts in enshrining aca-
demic freedom is that administrators or government officials may “chill that free
play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice,”146
that without judicial protection high-minded expression may be limited.  But
this is a concern reserved primarily for academe, a province necessarily involv-
ing the exchange of ideas. As another commentator explains the courts’ defer-
ence to academic expression,
[T]he university setting is different from the workplace.  Workplace speech is
dom was violated by state’s investigation).
139. Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 314 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
140. Id. (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
141. American Assoc. of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom and
Tenure, in AMERICAN FREEDOM AND TENURE  34 (Louis Joughin ed., 1969).
142. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE  L.J.
251, 255 (1989).
143. See id.
144. See Candido, supra note 137.
145. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
146. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195
(1952) (Black, J., concurring)).
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generally limited to that which is necessary to get the job done, and restrictions
are permitted on speech that gets in the way of the job.  University education,
on the other hand, requires that students confront and engage in speech that is
often offensive and disagreeable.  The heart of undergraduate and graduate
education takes place in the context of wide open debate.147
IV. CRITIQUE
My point here is not to challenge academic freedom but to urge that it be
kept in perspective.  Certainly, faculty and students deserve deference when en-
gaged in scholarly expression.  I, no less than others, am concerned about chill-
ing academic interchange and the innovative ideas that can be created in an at-
mosphere of open dialogue.  But my concern is that academic freedom has
become, or at least is becoming, a defensive shield that discourages courts (and
perhaps collegiate administrators) from enforcing equal opportunity require-
ments within academic life.
As an initial matter, the Eleventh Circuit reminds us that academic freedom
is not an independent First Amendment right.148  To the contrary, colleges may
regulate expression where it materially disrupts classwork or other university
activities or unduly interferes with the rights of others.149  In fact, as Cass Sun-
stein notes, “[C]olleges and universities are often in the business of controlling
speech, and their controls are hardly ever thought to raise free speech prob-
lems.”150  He adds:
There are major limits on what students can say in the classroom.  For example,
they cannot discuss the presidential election if the subject is math.  The same is
true for faculty members. . . . The problem goes deeper.  A paper or examination
that goes far afield from the basic approach of the course can be penalized with-
out offense to the First Amendment.151
Sunstein’s point seems to elude a number of courts and commentators,
whose response is a blanket claim that the “prohibition of discriminatory speech
which creates a hostile environment” may be applied in “employment, not edu-
cational, settings.”152  As they say, such restrictions are acceptable in the work-
place because, unlike college campuses, “the First Amendment has no applica-
tion” there.153  The First Amendment protects “public discourse”—those
“communicative processes necessary for the formation of public opinion.”154 By
their very nature, universities are concerned with public discourse, but as the
same commentators maintain, “[s]peech in the workplace does not generally
147. Jeanne M. Craddock, Constitutional Law —”Words that Injure; Laws that Silence:” Campus Hate
Speech Codes and the Threat to American Education, 22 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.  1047, 1049 (1995).
148. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991).
149. See Arthur L. Coleman & Jonathan R. Alger, Beyond Speech Codes: Harmonizing Rights of Free
Speech and Freedom from Discrimination on University Campuses, 23 J.C. & U.L. 91, 93 (1996).
150. Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 830 (1993).
151. Id. at 830.
152. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
153. Browne, supra note 71, at 513.
154. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV.
267, 289 (1991).
GOULDMACRO5 06/08/99  2:47 PM
78 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 6:61 1999
constitute public discourse.”155  “[W]ithin the workplace . . . an image of dialogue
among autonomous self-governing citizens would be patently out of place.”156
Yet this view fails to appreciate the expanding role of the workplace in
public discourse and its similarities to the academy.  “[C]ommunication contrib-
uting to public opinion is [hardly] limited to the press, handbillers on public
streets, and fiery orators in the parks. . . . [F]or most citizens—who are not politi-
cal activists—the great bulk of their discussion of political and social issues
probably occurs in the home and the workplace.”157  Indeed,
[t]he special import of speech in the workplace is crucially affected by the role of
the workplace as an intermediate institution in the society.  The workplace me-
diates between individuals and the society as a whole, and it affords a space in
which individuals cultivate some of the values, habits, and traits that carry over
to their roles as citizens.  In the workplace individuals interact with others—
initially strangers, often from diverse cultural, ethnic, political, and religious
backgrounds—in a constructive way toward common aims.158
If one did not know this passage’s source,  one might  consider it to be from
a college catalogue. Just as the workplace serves as an intermediate institution,
so too the college campus brings together people of varied backgrounds to learn
from and with each other.  Open dialogue is important in each setting.
A critical reader may object to this point, unconvinced that the workplace
and college campus share similar interests. After all, unlike the college student,
an employee is paid to work, not converse.  Moreover, the college campus is
composed of several settings—classroom, dormitories, open fora—each of which
demand different approaches by the First Amendment.  Even if we accept the
notion that the classroom and workplace share much in common, the Supreme
Court has already ruled that a college campus, “at least for its students, pos-
sesses many of the characteristics of a public forum.”159
The criticism is well taken, for the similarities between the college campus
and workplace are not absolute.  That, however,  should not dissuade our analy-
sis.  Much of this paper considers the courts’ treatment of harassment on the
shop floor and in the classroom, the two sites that are most comparable.  In this
respect, both Title VII and Title IX seek to prevent the same kind of harass-
ment—speech so “serious or pervasive” that it impedes equal opportunity in the
workplace or classroom.
Even if we consider other venues on campus, the analysis  should not fail.
If we move out of the classroom and into the dormitories, civility constraints are
even more important.  A student’s dorm room is her home on campus, and the
added privacy she deserves there includes protection against uninvited and of-
fensive harassment.160  Perhaps the only place on campus where harassment
155. Browne, supra note 71, at 515.
156. Post, supra note 154, at 289.
157. Browne, supra note 71, at 515.
158. Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory
Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 727 (1997).
159. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981)
160. As Coleman and Alger add, “college dormitories are essentially the temporary private resi-
dences of individuals within the microcosm of a society that is a higher education institution.  Thus,
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policies would be inappropriate is the college public square, where students set
up tables and soap boxes and debate the finer (and not so fine) points of the day.
This I would concede is close to a public forum, a site no one need visit or re-
main.  I certainly appreciate the perspective of those who argue a college cam-
pus cannot be a true public forum—that because the entire college serves an in-
termediate function civility constraints are appropriate even in the campus
square.  But we do not need to concern ourselves with this question because, as
Silva and Cohen indicate, many of the courts that refuse to enforce hostile envi-
ronment claims confine their analysis to classroom activities.
But if the workplace shares a quasi-public aspect with college campuses,
how do we justify hostile environment restrictions in either setting?  In fact, are
we not trying to have it both ways?  Under traditional First Amendment juris-
prudence, both settings are either private forum, where expression may be more
easily regulated, or the two are public sites where speech is presumed to be free
and open.  How does one justify  hostile work environment in this situation, let
alone collegiate harassment policies?
The answer, I think, may come  from Cynthia Estlund, who herself borrows
from Robert Post. To the extent that both the workplace and the college campus
produce public discourse, “civility constraints”161 are appropriate in each to pre-
vent the type of poisoned attacks that destroy rational deliberation and the
“possibility of constructive engagement.”162  Civility constraints are a set of
ground rules that say open dialogue rests on an assumption of decorum, that ef-
fective learning or work is impossible in an atmosphere of personal attack.163  As
Estlund herself explains:
If we understand public discourse as speech that is relevant to the collective
process of self-definition and decisionmaking, then civility constraints and the
preconditions of rational deliberation seem to belong somewhere within the
realm of public discourse. . . . On this view, institutions such as schools and
workplaces may be important sites for public discourse, though surely not of
unbounded critical interaction.164
Civility constraints also imply a certain level of equality in both the work-
place and classroom.  If both sites serve as mediating institutions, it is crucial
that no group of workers or students (faculty or staff) receive special preferences
or disparate treatment without a valid basis.  Against this backdrop, some com-
mentators have argued that the government’s interest in workplace equality
stands alone as a justification for punishing some harassment.165  As they say,
“speech that the speaker knows is offensive,” that is directed at an employee be-
the educational benefits in this context must by necessity include the benefits typically associated
with living in one’s own home, including privacy, personal security and safety.  Conduct within this
realm of interaction must be regulated to the extent necessary to protect these interests.” Coleman &
Alger, supra note 149, at 121.
161. Estlund, supra note 158, at 736.
162. Id. at 735.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 736.
165. See Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1791, 1843-47 (1992).
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cause of her sex, and that creates a hostile work environment may be restricted
because it devalues the position of women in the workplace.166  But again, it is
entirely unclear why this rationale should not also extend to the classroom.  As
another commentators admits, “if the workplace context of offensive speech
matters only because of the importance of equality in employment, then similar
speech restrictions should be accepted in any sphere in which we could discern a
strong commitment to equality, such as education . . . .”167  Indeed, the very basis
of Title IX is gender equity in education.168  Because “[s]exual harassment creates
an inhospitable, and even abusive, educational environment for women . . . [it]
functions in much the same way as overt exclusion to create a significant barrier
to equal opportunity in education.  The denial of women’s educational equality
sustains women’s subordinate social and work status and subverts women’s
pursuit of autonomy.”169
Of course, one person’s ‘civility constraint’ is another’s ‘viewpoint dis-
crimination,’ and many observers and courts instinctively flinch when hostile
environment claims are applied to the college campus.170  To be sure, there is
precedent to fear censorship on campus. Apart from the McCarthy era, there
have been cases in which university officials censored or expelled students be-
cause they deviated from “proper” values or beliefs.171  And, of course, the fear
of chilling speech is real, especially in an environment that prizes open dialogue.
But it is entirely possible to use sexual harassment law to forbid harassment
in the classroom without touching other speech that is endemic to the educa-
tional mission.  That higher education tolerates and encourages freedom of
thought does not mean that we should hold off from punishing harassment in
the classroom.  In fact, harassment cases arise only infrequently and are unlikely
to constrain meaningful discussion.172  The terms of the claim insure this. By re-
quiring that conduct be so “severe or pervasive” that it affects the educational
environment, harassment law should screen out comments and behavior that are
merely annoying, distasteful, or occur only once ore twice.
In the end, I believe academic freedom has become a straw man, obscuring
the real explanation for the courts’—and many academicians’—diffidence over
hostile environment claims in the academy: they don’t want the responsibility of
evaluating which speech is permissible and which comments are harassing.  As
a former college administrator I can certainly appreciate this concern, but it fails
to relieve us of the responsibility of removing harassment from the academic en-
vironment.173  The task is hardly different from other settings, where supervisors
166. Id. at 1846.
167. Estlund, supra note 158, at 715.
168. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
169. Candido, supra note 137, at 108.
170. See, e.g., Silva, 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994); UWM Post v. University of Wis., 774 F. Supp.
1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Browne, supra note 71; Post, supra note 154.
171. In the 1928 case, Anthony v. Syracuse University, 224 A.D. 487 (1928), the Supreme Court of
New York permitted university administrators to expel a student because “they did not think of her
[as] ‘a typical Syracuse girl.’”  Id. at 489.
172. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
173. Among other things, I recognize how a harassment charge against one faculty member can
affect others, at times making them timid in class.  In some sense this is a fact of life we must live
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have to distinguish between harmless expressions of opinion and those that ac-
tively discriminate.174  If anything, the responsibility is greater in collegiate life,
where “the Nation’s youth are exposed to a multitude of  ideas that will strongly
influence their future development.  To permit  discrimination here would, more
than in any other area, tend to promote misconceptions leading to future pat-
terns of discrimination.”175
Professors and administrators may not think this is their duty, but they
have been doing similar things for years.  Just as teachers reprimand students
for speaking out of turn or straying wildly off topic, so may college officials
punish students or faculty who seek to harass members of the college commu-
nity.176  A similar point holds true for the courts.  Just as they have allowed em-
ployers to discipline employees who harass co-workers, they must permit col-
leges to punish those faculty or students who interfere with the educational
rights of others.  Academic freedom is about education.  When hostile behavior
gets in the way of the educational process, academic freedom must give way to
equal opportunity.
with in order to eradicate serious and pervasive harassment.  The answer, I think, is to push for-
ward anyhow, recognizing that teaching styles receive judicial deference, and to be unafraid to turn
down harassment charges firmly when they have no merit.
174. See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989) (discussing the
challenges in separating personal opinion from actionable attacks).
175. Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 345 (1st Cir. 1989).
176. Among the possible sanctions are warning, reprimand, counseling, suspension or expul-
sion/termination.
